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Abstract 
The uncertainty of probabilistic evaluations results from the lack of sufficient information and/or knowledge 
underlying those random events. Uncertainty representation in the form of second order probability distribution 
or interval evaluations does not cause any objections from the theoretical point of view. On the other hand, what 
is worthy in the second order probabilities is that they allow one to model a real uncertainty of subjective 
probabilistic evaluations resulting from the lack of information and/or knowledge. Processing of uncertain 
information regarding probabilistic evaluations can help make a validated decision about the collection of 
additional information aimed to remove completely or to reduce the existing uncertainty. 
Keywords:  probabilistic evaluations, uncertainty, decision making. 
 
Sources of occurrence of uncertain probabilistic evaluations  
Whenever practical applications of probability theory are considered, it is explicitly 
assumed that all probabilistic evaluations are of deterministic nature. Strictly speaking, one 
can speak correctly about the absolute validity of probabilistic evaluations only within the 
classical approach to probability evaluation. In turn, the validity of probabilistic evaluations 
within the frequency approach greatly depends on the volume and validity of the initial 
statistical data. As regards subjective probabilistic evaluations, the theory of subjective 
probabilities imposes a strict requirement: the expert has to assign unambiguous point 
evaluations to the probabilities of random events or variables being evaluated. The theory of 
subjective probabilities is entirely based on that requirement. It simply forbids any uncertainty 
in probabilistic evaluations. 
Let us consider the possibilities of practical implementation of this requirement in more 
detail. As is generally known, one of the underlying postulates of the general theory of 
measurement is formulated as the necessity to correctly account the measurement errors. 
Every measurement of physical values can be performed within the accuracy ensured by 
measuring equipment and conditions of measurement. Hence, the results of any measurement 
can always be represented in the form A ± ε, where A is the result of measurement but ε is 
possible measurement error. In essence, that form represents a confidence interval within 
which there is for guarantee situated the real meaning of the measured value. 
The occurrence sources of probabilistic evaluation uncertainties are described in 
numerous literature [1-6]. The main source of potential uncertainty is the uncertainty 
regarding the underlying events, facts, statements and hypotheses. The theory of subjective 
probabilities is based on the statement that any subjective probability assignment is made on 
the basis of all the information available. Frequently, that fact is explicitly emphasised by 
denoting the subjective probability of event e as p(e / ζ) where ζ is the information, on the 
basis of which the evaluation of p(e ) was performed. From this it can be concluded correctly 
that the subjective probabilistic evaluation is in essence an evaluation of the conditional 
probability. When making subjective evaluation of probabilities, the expert explicitly or 
implicitly takes into account the variety of conditions ζ. If the conditions are uncertain for the 
expert, it is quite natural that it would be difficult for him to produce point-valued 
probabilities required. The evaluation becomes uncertain for him over the whole set of 
uncertain conditions, ζ. 
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There also exists another important source of uncertainties or ambiguities in assigning 
subjective probability values. The reason for that could be mental limitations of ability of 
individuals to assign point-valued probabilities under the existing state of knowledge. 
Frequently, individuals cannot distinguish separate gradations of probabilities, even if there is 
enough information. Numerous studies have shown that certain extent of uncertainty is an 
inherent attribute of human thinking. The inability to distinguish and interpret sufficiently 
close probability values is akin to the inability of human beings to distinguish close colour 
nuances. 
 
Second order probabilities 
Current uncertainties regarding the values of probabilities can conveniently be modelled 
by belief networks. Fig. 1 represents an ordinary belief network [5]. 
 
Fig. 1. Belief network that models the relationship between the disease and symptom 
 
Node A represents two random events: a1 –presence at the patient of the certain disease, 
a2 – absence at the patient of this disease. Node B represents two random events: b1 – 
presence at the patient of the certain symptom, b2 – absence at the patient of this symptom. 
Unconditional probabilities of event a1 and a2 as well as conditional probabilities of event b1 
provided event a1 and event a2, are specified. Conditional probabilities p(b2 / a1) and p(b2 / a2) 
are not of interest to us in the example under consideration, so their values are not set. 
Let us first assume that all the probability values are determined on the basis of 
extensive statistical data, so their validity is high. If symptom b1 is observed at the patient, the 
posterior conditional probability of disease a1 can easily be calculated. By using Bayes’ 
formula we obtain  
 
p(a1 / b1) = p(b1 / a1) p(a1) / (p(b1 /a1) p(a1) + p(b1 / a2) p(a2)) = 
= 0,9*0,4 / (0,9*0,4 + 0,1*0,6) ≈ 0,86. 
 
On the basis of this probability value, the physician can make a decision about the 
method of treatment. 
Let us now assume that there is no statistical data to determine the objective values of 
probabilities, so the expert is asked to assign the probabilities. The expert has a large 
experience in the area under consideration. He assigns with a large extent of confidence the 
same value of probabilities p(b1 / a1) and p(b1 / a2) that were determined previously on the 
basis of statistical data. The expert, however, finds difficulty in assigning point values of 
probability p(a1). Considering certain values of probability p(a1) as random events c1, c2, c3, 
he has assigned the probabilities of those events as follows: 
 
p(c1) = p(p(a1) = 0,1) = 0,2; 
A
B
 p(a1) = 0,4
 p(a2) = 0,6
 p(b1 / a1) = 0,9
 p(b1 / a2) = 0,1
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p(c2) = p(p(a1) = 0,4) = 0,6; 
p(c3) = p(p(a1) = 0,7) = 0,2. 
 
The existing state of information is modelled using the belief network shown in Fig.2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Belief network modelling the uncertainty of probability values p(a1) 
 
The only way to determine point values of probability p(a1) is to calculate its expected 
value over the whole available set of random values: 
 
E(p(a1)) = i=1
n
 p(a1 / ci) p(ci) = 0,1*0,2 + 0,4*0,6 + 0,7*0,2 = 0,40. 
 
The calculated expected value E(p(a1)) is exactly equal to the value of probability p(a1) 
previously determined by using valid statistical data. If the posterior probability of disease a1 
given symptom b1 is determined, the same value of that probability will be obtained, i.e. 0,86. 
Although being formally similar, these evaluations represent quite different states of prior 
information. The first evaluation obtained on the basis of objective initial information has a 
large confidence degree. In other words, if the physician has such evaluation at his disposal, 
he can make a decision concerning the method of treatment in full confidence that this 
evaluation is exactly equal to the probability of presence of this disease at the patient. In the 
second instance the matter is far from being so successful. From uncertainty of expert’s 
evaluation actual value p(a1) can be far from expected value. Using this example the 
following important conclusion can be drawn. When uncertain probabilistic evaluations are 
employed, the transition to the mathematical expectation does not reduce the initial 
uncertainty. That uncertainty is implicitly included in further calculations and leads to the 
implicit uncertainty of the results and consequences of the actions undertaken. An explicit 
account of that uncertainty by means of calculating the interval of possible values of the 
resulting probability can help further analyse the uncertainties in the following way. If the 
user is satisfied with that interval of probability uncertainty in the context of the problem of 
interest, he may use the expected value as a point value of the corresponding probability. If 
the uncertainty is large, a decision to collect additional information can be made. In other 
words, the correct analysis of uncertainties of probabilistic evaluations cannot raise the 
validity of the final results. It, however, makes the basis of evaluation of the suitability extent 
of the initial information. 
 
C
A
B
 p(c1) = 0,2
 p(c2) = 0,6
 p(c3) = 0,2
 p(a1 / c1) = 0,1
 p(a1 / c2) = 0,4
 p(a1 / c3) = 0,7
 p(b1 / a1) = 0,9
 p(b1 / a2) = 0,1
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Interval probabilities and multiple probability distributions 
Specification of probabilistic evaluations in the form of intervals of possible values 
represents essential lack of information and/or knowledge on the subject domain. If the expert 
is not able to unambiguously evaluate probabilities of events and even assign the probability 
distribution in the set of uncertain probabilistic evaluations, he may simply set intervals of 
possible values of the required probabilistic evaluations. It can easily be seen that interval 
evaluations of probabilities lead to a set of probability distributions compatible with the 
existing state of information. Let us consider an evident example illustrating how the lack of 
the initial information is translated into the essential uncertainty of the results [7]. A 
hypothetical sensor produces indication of the temperature of the process of production. There 
are two temperature gradations: high (HT) and low (LT). When the temperature is high, the 
lamp is red (RC). If the temperature is low, it has a blue colour (BC). Unfortunately, sensor's 
thermometer is a very fragile device and can be broken even at a slight shaking. The 
probability that it is broken is 20% at any moment of time. When the thermometer is broken, 
the sensor indication is not related to the real temperature of the process. Imagine a new 
technician is observing that the lamp is blue. What is the real temperature at these conditions? 
How it is possible to evaluate the probability that the temperature is really high or low? 
Cartesian product defines a common space of all possible scenarios for that situation  
 
Ω = S x T x Q, 
 
where  S = {BC, RC} – a set of sensor indication states; 
       T = {HТ, LТ} – a set of temperature states of the process; 
       Q = {WS, NWS} – a set of sensor thermometer states: WS – working state; NWS  – non-
working state (the thermometer is broken) . 
All the scenarios are shown in Table 1. Each scenario is denoted by letter a, b, … , and 
h. 
Let us show that it is not possible to perform common probabilistic analysis under this 
state of information. From Table 1 it follows that these limitations are valid:  
 
                                 p (WS) = p(a) + p(b) + p(c) + p(D) = 0,8;     (1) 
                                 p (NWS) = p(e) + p(f) + p(g) + p(h) = 0,2.    (2) 
 
Table 1. 
Set of possible scenarios of states of a hypothetical sensor  
 
State of sensor's thermometer 
 
Colour of sensor 
 Blue colour (Blue) Red colour (Red) 
 Temperature 
 HT (High) LТ (Low) HT (High) LТ (Low) 
WS (Working) a b c d 
NWS (Non-working) e f g h 
 
When the thermometer of the sensor is in operation (WS), the sensor has red colour 
(RC) at the high temperature (HT) and blue colour (BC) at the low temperature (LT). From 
this it follows that 
 
p(a) = p(d) = 0. 
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If the sensor’s thermometer is in non-working state (NWS), sensor indication (RC or 
BC) is not related to the temperature value: HT or LT. The state of the sensor can be 
represented as  
 
p(BC / NWS, HT) = p(BC / NWS, LT). 
 
Hence, 
 
p(e) / (p(e) + p(g)) = p(f) / (p(f) + p(h)). 
 
Let us denote the probability that the sensor has a blue colour provided that the 
thermometer is broken as  
 
α = p(BC, NWS) = (p(e) + p(f)) / ((p(e) + p(f) + p(g) + p(h)) 
 
and the posterior probability that the temperature is low as  
 
β = p(LТ) = p(b) + p(f) + p(h). 
 
As the state of the thermometer (WS or NWS) depends on another effects and is not 
related to the temperature (HT or LT), we have 
 
p(WS / HT) = p(WS), 
 
hence, 
 
(p(a) + p(c)) / (p(a) + p(c) + p(e) + p(g)) = 0,8. 
 
Using limitations (1) and (2), and all the preceding statements, Table 1 can be 
represented as follows (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. 
Probability distribution of scenarios in the task of hypothetical sensor  
 
State of sensor's thermometer 
Colour of sensor 
 BC (Blue) RC (Red) 
 Temperature 
 HT (High) LT (Low) HT (High) LT (Low) 
WS (Working) 0 0,8β 0,8(1 – β) 0 
NWS (Non-working) 0,2(1 – β)α 0,2βα 0,2(1-β)(1-α) 0,2β(1 – α) 
 
The existing limitations (1) and (2) do not enable one to unambiguously determine 
values α and β. We are interested in knowing the probability that the temperature of the 
process is really low at the blue colour of the sensor and the existing state of information. 
Using the data of Table 2 we receive the following expression for the probability under 
consideration: 
 
p(LT / BC) = (p(b)+p(f)) / (p(a)+p(b)+p(e)+p(f)) = (0,8 + 0,2)β / (0,8β + 0,2α). 
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Even if probability β is known, it is not clear which value must probability α have to 
unambiguously define p(LT / BC). The information available is not sufficient to solve the task 
stated by means of conventional apparatus of probability theory. It is only possible to set 
some intervals for values α and β. 
To reduce uncertainty in the tasks of this kind, one can employ the principle of 
maximum entropy or a model of lower and upper probabilities. 
The method of interval probabilistic evaluations proposed by Neapolitan [5] is also of 
interest. The method is worked out for the case when there is a system of n random events, 
and the probability values for those events are specified in the form of intervals. Let us first 
consider a case when the system includes two random events E = e1, e2. The probabilities of 
the events are: 
 
p(e1)  [0; 0,5];              p(e2)  [0,5; 1]. 
 
Let us include random variables X1 and X2. in the consideration. X1 represents possible 
values of probability p(e1) but X2 represents possible values of probability p(e2). Variable X1 
may assume values in the interval [0; 0,5]. Since the values of probabilities p(e1) and p(e2) are 
connected by relationship p(e1) + p(e2) = 1, assigning of any value for X1 unambiguously 
determines the corresponding value of X2, and vice versa. Assigning the interval of possible 
values of the probability does not assume any probabilistic distribution in this interval. One 
can, however, suppose that possible values of probabilities have a uniform distribution in the 
interval. That assumption is not in contradiction to the initial conditions. Then, treating the 
expected values of probabilities p(e1) and p(e2) in the corresponding interval as point-valued 
probabilities, we have: 
 
E(X1) = E(p(e1)) = ∫0
0,5
 x1/(0,5 – 0)dx1 = 0,25; 
E(X2) = E(p(e2)) = ∫0,5
1
 x1/(1 – 0,5)dx1 = 0,75. 
 
It should be noted that an assumption about the uniform distribution density of the 
evaluated variable in the interval of its determination is nothing but an assumption. It does not 
represent the real state of things but at the same time does not contradict evidently this state of 
things. Setting the probability distribution of the values of the random variable and setting an 
interval of its possible values are two different things that are not related to each other. The 
method suggested by Neapolitan is an attempt to at least consistently connect two different 
representations of uncertain information with each other. 
Now consider the Neapolitan method in general form. A complete system of n random 
events is specified. The probabilities of the events are set in the form of intervals:  
 
pi  [ai; bi], i = 1, … , n. 
 
Denote a random variable representing the uniform distribution values of probability pi 
in the i-th interval as Xi. The difficulty is that point values E(pi) must satisfy the requirement 
of connectivity i=1
n
 E(pi) = 1. To solve the task formulated, the author proposes first to 
determine new intervals of values of the corresponding probabilities as follows:  
 
x*2(x1) = max (a1, 1 – x1 – b3 – b4 - … - bn); 
x**2(x1) = min (b2, 1 – x1 – a3 – a4 - … - an); 
 
x*3(x1, x2) = max (a3, 1 – x1 – x2 – b4 - … - bn); 
x**3(x1, x2) = min (b3, 1 – x1 – x2 – a4 - … - an); 
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x*n-1(x1, x2, … , xn-2) = max (an-1, 1 – x1 – x2 - … - xn-2 – bn); 
x**n-1(x1, x2, … , xn-2) = min (bn-1, 1 – x1 –x2 - … - xn-2 – an). 
 
 Then value 1(x1) is calculated using expression that follows: 
 
μ1(x1) = (∫x*2
x**2
 ∫x*3
x**3
 … ∫x* n-1
x** n-1
 dxn-1dxn-2 … dx2) / 
                        (∫a1
b1
 ∫x*2
x**2
 ∫x*3
x**3
 … ∫x* n-1
x** n-1
 dxn-1dxn-2dx1).         
 
The expected value of probability p1 is calculated as  
 
                                               E(p1) = ∫a1
b1
 x1 μ(x1)dx1.                    
 
Then all the calculations are repeated in the same way for probabilities p2, … , pn. 
The values of integrals in the above expressions can be calculated by means of integer 
integration.  
Example. Assume that a complete system of random events E = e1, e2, e3, e4 is set with 
the following interval values of probabilities:  
 
p(e1)  [0,2; 0,5];     p(e2)  [0,2; 0,4];     p(e3)  [0,1; 0,6];     p(e4)  [0; 0,5]. 
 
Applying the above-considered method we obtain these point values of probabilities:  
 
E(p(e1)) = 0,320;      E(p(e2)) = 0,287;      E(p(e3)) = 0,246;      E(p(e4)) = 0,146. 
 
 The undoubted advantage of the method is that it automatically meets the requirement 
of connectivity i=1
n
 p(ei) =1. The shortcoming of this method is computational difficulties.  
 
Uncertain probability evaluations: the pros and cons  
The uncertainty of probabilistic evaluations results from the lack of sufficient 
information and/or knowledge underlying those random events. Uncertainty representation in 
the form of second order probability distribution or interval evaluations does not cause any 
objections from the theoretical point of view. However, due to uncertain probabilities, certain 
problems of conceptual nature arise. First, many theorists and practitioners have a sharply 
expressed aversion of the fact that probability values act as random events. Educated in the 
way of classic probability theory, certain scientists are in principle against second order 
probabilities. Many adherents of the subjective probability theory are also against second 
order probabilities as these probabilities are simply forbidden by that theory. There exists 
another conceptual problem related to second order probabilities that consists in that, if 
second order probabilities are incorporated, then there is no any principal obstacle to 
incorporate probabilities of the third order and higher. In the limit case it could lead to infinite 
hierarchy of probabilities. This is the problem, which many scientists who work in the area of 
probability are anxious about. Real life, however, shows, that even in the most complicated 
situations it is quite enough to work with probabilities of the second order, or in the extreme 
case, of the third order. That is why the problem of the infinite hierarchy seems to be far-
fetched. 
On the other hand, what is worthy in the second order probabilities is that they allow 
one to model a real uncertainty of subjective probabilistic evaluations resulting from the lack 
of information and/or knowledge. In classic probability theory, the problem of probability 
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uncertainty simply does not exist as probability evaluations are based on extensive fact 
material and strict logical argumentation.  
Based on the above short examination of uncertainties of the probability evaluations, the 
following general conclusions can be drawn. 
 1. Application of the second order probabilities and interval values makes it possible 
to model natural uncertainties of expert judgements regarding the evaluations assigned. These 
uncertainties are the result of insufficient initial information and/or knowledge.  
 2. The source of uncertainty of probabilistic evaluations is uncertainties underlying the 
conditions and limitations of human mental activities.  
 3. Various methods to manage uncertain probabilistic evaluations are developed. Each 
of the methods possesses both advantages and shortcomings.  
 4. Processing of uncertain information regarding probabilistic evaluations can help 
make a validated decision about the collection of additional information aimed to remove 
completely or to reduce the existing uncertainty.  
 5. Probability theory is successfully employed to cope with the uncertainties of the 
surrounding world provided that a whole series of fairly strict conditions are satisfied. The 
incorporation of uncertain probabilistic evaluations allows one to broaden the existing 
boundaries of probability theory application since the world surrounding us is too complicated 
to be described successfully by means of classical probability only. 
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